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One  of  the  interesting  developments  on  the 
American  banking  scene  during  the  post-World 
War  II  era  has  been  the  increased  interest  shown 
by  minority  groups  in  the  ownership  and  oper- 
ation  of  commercial  banks.  Of  the  81  minority 
banks  in  existence  at  year-end  1975,  only  8  were 
operating  in  1945.  Fifteen  more  opened  between 
1946  and  1969,  while  58  date  from  1970.  Although 
there  were  only  81  minority  banks  among  the 
14,400  commercial  banks  in  operation  at  the  close 
of  1975,  the  net  increase  in  minority  banks  since 
the  beginning  of  this  decade  amounts  to  over  250 
percent,  while  the  increase  for  nonminority  banks 
amounts  to  only  12  percent.  Of  the  81  banks 
identified  as  minority  institutions,  47  were  owned 
by  blacks  and  ‘27  were  classified  as  Hispanic- 
American,  with  the  remainder  being  distributed 
among  Chinese-American  (3),  American  Indian 
(Z),  Asian-American  (l),  and  Multiracial  (1)  mi- 
nority  groups.  Two  of  these  81  banks  were  actu- 
ally  organized  as  nonminority  banks,  but  were 
later  taken  over  by  minority  interests.” 
The  sudden  proliferation  in  minority-owned 
banking  institutions  has  attracted  considerable 
attention,  largely  because  the  financial  and  eco- 
nomic  aspects  of  minority  banking  are  recognized 
as  unique  in  the  industry.  These  organizations 
provide  banking  services  primarily  to  the  nation’s 
minority  population,  and  the  special  business  cir- 
cumstances  they  face  are  related  to  the  special 
position  occupied  by  minority  groups  in  the  na- 
tional  economy.  The  close  tie  between  the  eco- 
nomic  position  of  blacks  and  the  operation  of 
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I A  hank  is  recognized  as  minority-owned  when  50  percent  or  more 
of  its  common  stock  is  owned  or  controlled  by  individuals  belongina 
to  racial  minority  groups.  OXBE  of  the  Commerce  Department. 
and  the  Treasury  Department,  which  is  responsible  for  administra- 
tion  of  the  Government’s  Minority  Bank  Deposit  Program,  officially 
designate  minority  banks.  A  recent  amendment  to  the  rules  govern- 
ing  the  Minority  Bank  Deposit  Program  allows  a  bank  to  qualify  if: 
more  than  50  percent  of  the  bank’s  stock  is  owned  by  women;  a 
majority  of  tbe  bank’s  board  consists  of  women:  and  women  hold  a 
significant  number  of  management  positions. 
black  banks,  for  example,  is  made  by  Brimmer 
[7;  p.  3S2].  IVevertheIess,  it  is  also  true  that  a 
great  deal  of  variability  exists  -w&in  the  ranks  of 
minority  banks  when  it  comes  to  successfully 
dealing  with  these  unique  business  circumstances. 
The  primary  objective  of  this  study  is  to  analyze 
those  factors  that  lie  behind  the  successful  oper- 
ation  of  minority  banks. 
There  are,  no  doubt,  many  reasons  for  the 
sharp  acceleration  in  the  establishment  of  mi- 
nority  banks  during  the  1970’s.  Based  on  inter- 
views  with  persons  instrumental  in  organizing 
a  number  of  these  banks,  however,  three  factors 
emerge  as  being  central  to  the  decision-making 
process  leadin  g  to  application  for  a  bank  charter. 
The  first  of  these  involves  an  increased  aware- 
ness  by  minority  group  entrepreneurs  of  the 
profitability  of  commercial  banking.  Indeed,  the 
success  of  existing  minority  banks  became  widely 
publicized  during  the  late  1960’s  and  early  1970’s, 
and  there  was  reason  to  believe  that  economic  ad- 
vances  being  made  by  minorities  provided  an 
even  more  advantageous  market  for  banking  ser- 
vices.  The  second  factor  concerns  the  improved 
environment  for  seeking  and  obtaining  bank  char- 
ters.  Doubtlessly  a  part  of  the  change  in  this 
environment  reflected  the  momentum  of  civil 
rights  legislation  passed  during  the  middle  and 
late  1960’s.  Likewise,  this  was  the  period  when 
minority  groups  began  to  achieve  greater  politi- 
cal  influence  at  both  the  state  and  national  levels, 
and  this  influence,  at  times,  proved  effective  in 
iiopening  the  door”  to  the  chartering  agencies  and 
breaking  bottlenecks  for  charter  applications 
previously  submitted.  The  third  factor  focuses 
on  the  then  growing  belief  that  locally-owned 
commercial  banks  could  provide  a  stimulus  to 
economic  development  in  the  minority  commu- 
nity.  Although  some  have  questioned  the  ability 
of  minority  banks  to  perform  this  function  suc- 
cessfully  (see  Brimmer  [T;  p.  399]),  organizers 
of  minority  banks  did  in  fact  envision  a  signifi- 
cant  role  for  their  institutions  in  the  development 
of  minority  business  enterprise. 
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banks  have  been  the  focus  of  a  number  of  studies 
[2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  11,  13,  141.  Most  studies  of 
minority  bank  financial  performance  have  con- 
sidered  bank  operating  characteristics  in  a  com- 
parative  context.  Using  this  methodology,  mi- 
nority  banks  have  usually  been  compared  to  some 
other  group  of  banks  consisting  of  nonminority 
institutions,  sometimes  taking  the  form  of  all 
commercial  banks  or  all  nonminority  banks. 
Brimmer  [7],  for  example,  compares  the  perform- 
ance  of  black  banks  with  that  of  all  insured  com- 
mercial  banks  and  all  member  banks  of  the  Fed- 
eral  Reserve  System. 
Other  studies  have  also  followed  the  relative 
performance  methodology  but  have  been  more 
selective  in  choosing  comparative  sample  groups 
of  banks.  In  a  companion  to  the  Brimmer  article 
mentioned  above,  Irons  [ 111  views  the  operating 
characteristics  of  18  black  banks  against  a  paired 
sample  of  20  nonminority  banks  and  a  national 
average  of  similarly  sized  banks.  Kohn  [13] 
compares  the  performance  of  6  minority  banks 
(5  of  which  are  located  in  the  Tenth  and  1  in 
the  Eighth  Federal  Reserve  District)  with  that 
of  two  groups  of  nonminority  banks:  43  estab- 
lished  member  banks  and  32  new  commercial 
banks,  all  located  in  the  Tenth  Federal  Reserve 
District.  Boorman  [2]  and  Boorman  and  Kwast 
[4]  compare  8  minority  banks  established  be- 
tween  1963  and  1965  with  a  paired  sample  of  non- 
minority  banks.  These  two  articles  isolate  the 
behavior  of  newly  formed  banks. 
There  are,  of  course,  widely  recognized  prob- 
lems  with  aggregating  together  all  minority 
banks,  or  for  that  matter  all  commercial  banks, 
for  comparative  purposes.  Even  when  adjusted 
by  size,  age  of  operation,  and  location,  it  is  diffi- 
cult  to  get  a  meaningful  sample  group  for  com- 
paring  the  operating  characteristics  of  minority 
and  nonminority  banks.  This  is  due  to  minority 
and  nonminority  banks  serving  communities  that 
are  quite  different  in  terms  of  their  social  and  eco- 
nomic  makeup.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that 
there  is  something  to  be  said  for  intragroup  com- 
parisons  of  minority  banks. 
Limited  intragroup  comparisons  of  minority 
banks  have  been  made,  notably  as  part  of  studies 
by  Leavitt  [14]  and  Boorman  [3].  In  these 
studies,  both  authors  attempt  to  distinguish  be- 
tween  newly  formed  and  mature  minority  banks. 
Leavitt  deals  exclusively  with  black  banks  and 
constructs  test  groups  on  the  basis  of  age  (all 
black  banks  three  years  old  versus  all  black  banks 
over  three  years  old)  and  charter  classification 
(national  and  state-insured  black  banks).  Boor- 
man  makes  the  most  serious  attempt  at  over- 
coming  the  problems  associated  with  intergroup 
bank  comparisons,  but  his  discussion  is  limited  to 
citing  the  differences  between  the  newer  and 
older  minority  banks.  Perhaps  most  importantly, 
Boorman  explicitly  recognizes  13;  p.  2781  tha.t 
i‘ .  .  .  other  factors  indicate  that  there  may  be 
significant  differences  in  performance  among  the 
minority  banks  themselves.”  It  is  this  central 
idea-that  performance  comparisons  of  minority 
banks  can  be  most  useful  when  made  with  other 
minority  banks-that  lies  at  the  base  of  this 
study. 
Segmenting  Minority  Banks  For  Comparison 
This  article  undertakes  an  intragroup  comparison 
of  minority  bank  performance  characteristics. 
Groups  are  identified  for  comparison  from  all 
minority-owned  commercial  banks  in  existence  as 
of  December  31,  1975,  i.e.,  the  universe  of  m.i- 
nority  banks.  The  key  advantage  of  an  intra- 
group  comparison  is  that  uncontrollable  differ- 
ences  between  groups  are  neutralized  to  the 
greatest  extent  possible.  At  points  in  the  analysis 
where  a  benchmark  would  be  useful,  however, 
reference  wilI  be  made  to  standards  maintained 
by  commercial  banks  generally. 
There  are  a  number  of  possible  ways  to  seg- 
ment  minority  banks  into  groups  for  comparative 
purposes.  As  already  mentioned,  several  previous 
studies  [3,  II]  have  emphasized  age  of  operation 
and  type  of  charter.  Other  possible  selection  cri- 
teria  include  location,  size,  and  perhaps  even 
racial  composition.  Using  nonfinancial  criteria 
as  a  basis  for  sample  selection,  however,  involves 
inherent  bias.  The  problem  is  that  the  use  of 
such  nonfinancial  criteria  involves  a  presupposition 
that  the  chosen  basis  for  sample  selection  is  in 
fact  a  critical  determinant  of  operating  perform- 
ance.  The  dangers  inherent  in  this  approach  are 
avoided  here  by  concentrating  on  strictly  finan- 
cial  characteristics  as  a  guide  to  selecting  minor- 
ity  bank  groups  for  comparison. 
Two  groups  of  banks  are  selected  from  .the 
universe,  with  a  four-year  consolidated  return  on 
investment  (CROI)  as  the  critical  selection  fac- 
tor.  Return  on  investment  is  used  because  of  its 
importance  as  a  basic  performance  index  in  the 
eyes  of  both  financial  analysts  and  private  in- 
vestors.  A  four-year  consolidation  procedure  is 
followed  in  order  to  insure  that  the  banks  se- 
lected  ior  the  comparison  groups,  hereafter  re- 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1976 ferred  to  as  the  “high-earning”  and  the  I$-esidual” 
groups,  have  demonstrated  earnings  performance 
that  can  be  considered  sustainable  over  time.2 
The  period  of  consolidarion  includes  the  years 
1972-75. 
Of  the  81  minority  banks  in  existence  as  of 
December  31,  1975,  45  had  been  in  operation  at 
least  four  years  or  longer.  Thus,  the  universe  of 
banks  available  for  selection  based  on  a  four-year 
consolidation  automatically  is  reduced  from  81  to 
45.  In  addition,  one  of  the  45  banks  is  further 
eliminated  due  to  its  basic  lack  of  coriformity 
with  the  rest  of  the  banks  making  up  the  uni- 
verse.3  The  comparison  groups,  therefore,  are 
chosen  from  among  these  44  remaining  minority 
banks. 
2 Sustainabilit4-  implies  some  degree  of  stability,  too.  A  coefficient 
of  variation  (i.e.,  the  standard  deviation  of  ROX  divided  by  the 
mean)  has  been  computed  for  each  of  the  I1  banks  in  the  high- 
earnina  group.  with  a  resulting  range  of  0.11  to  0.67.  Based  on 
only  four  years  of  performance  data,  these  coefficients  are  not 
suspiciously  large.  In  addition,  the  variation  is  being  measured 
around  high  mean  values  of  ROI. 
3This  bank  has  been  owned  by  minority  stockholders  for  only  5  of 
its  20  years  of  existence.  It  had  total  assets  at  December  31,  1975,  of 
$133  million,  placing  it  far  beyond  the  normal  size  range  of  the 
remaining  minority  banks. 
Bank  Nome 
Industrial  Bank  of 
Washington 
United  National  Bank  of 
Washington 
Mechanics  &  Farmers 
Bank 
First  State  Bank 
Highland  Community 
Sank 
South  Side  Sank’ 
Centinel  Bank 
Riverside  National  Sank 
Sank  of  Finance 
Cathay  Sank 
liberty  Bank  of  Seattle 
The  cutoff  point  for  a  CR01  that  places  a  bank 
in  the  high-earning  category  is  set  at  10  percent, 
a  commonly  used  rule  for  evaluating  business 
performance.  On  this  basis,  11  of  the  44  banks 
are  selected  for  the  high-earning  group.  These 
banks  are  listed  in  Table  I.  The  remaining  33 
banks  constitute  the  residual  group. 
Nonfinancial  Characteristics  As  Table  I  shows, 
the  high-earning  banks  constitute  a  fairly  diverse 
group.  Nine  of  the  eleven  (82  percent)  are  black- 
owned,  while  33  of  the  33  residual  banks  (76  per- 
cent)  are  black-owned.  -4s  is  also  the  case  ior  the 
residual  banks,  most  of  the  high-earning  banks 
are  located  ir.  large  metropolitan  areas,  although 
the  Northeasr  is  conspicuously  absent  (three  of 
the  banks  in  :he  residual  group  are  located  in  the 
Sew  York  City  area,  while  one  is  located  in 
Boston).  Three  of  the  high-earning  banks,  how- 
ever,  are  Iocared  in  cities  with  populations  less 
than  100,000.  In  terms  of  total  assets  at  year-end 
1975,  the  high-earning  banks  range  in  size  from 
$8.3  miliion  to  $56.3  million,  the  mean  size  being 
$26.5  million.  The  residual  banks  have  a  smaller 
Table  I 
ELEVEN  HIGH-EARNING  MtNORIfY  BANKS1 
Location 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Durham,  N.  C. 
Danville,  Va. 
Chicago,  111. 
Chicago,  Ill. 
Taos,  N.  M. 
Houston,  Tex. 
Los  Angeles,  Calif. 
Los  Angeles,  Calif. 
Seattle,  Wash. 
Charter  Class  and 
Federal  Reserve 
Membership  Status 
State  nonmember 
National 
State  nonmember 
State  nonmember 
State  nonmember 
State  member 
State  nonmember 
National 
State  nonmember 
State  nonmember 
State  nonmember 
1 Banks  with  four-year  consolidated  return  on  invesiment  of  IO  percent  or  better. 
’  Minority  shoreholders  gained  controlling  interest  5-l  -72. 
Esiablishment 
Date 
7ofal  Assets 
12-31-75 
5 Thousands 
a-i  a-34  40,082 
8-31-64  30,846 
3-l-08 
9-a-i  a 
41,199  Slack 
8,340  Black 
7 l-9-70  21,063 
l-1  -72  20,024 
1-5-69  11,636 
a- 16-63  12,974 
Il-16-64  39,032 
4- 19-62  56,317 














FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMQND mean  size  of  $18.7  million,  with  a  range  of  $4.5 
million  to  $62.4  million.  While  the  average  size 
high-earning  group  bank  is  about  40  percent  larger 
than  the  average  size  residual  group  bank,  there 
is  nonetheless  no  simple  association  between 
larger  size  and  higher  profits.  Indeed,  4  of  the  11 
high-earning  banks  fall  below  the  average  size  of 
the  residual  group  banks,  and  the  operating  econ- 
omies  enjoyed  by  a  $26  million  bank  over  an  $18 
million  bank  are  certainly  not  great. 
Eight  of  the  high-earning  banks  (73  percent) 
are  state  nonmember  banks,  2  are  national  banks, 
and  onIy  1  is  a  state  member  bank.  Among  the 
residual  banks,  on  the  other  hand,  19  (57  percent) 
are  state  nonmember  banks,  13  (41  percent)  are 
national  banks,  and,  again,  there  is  but  one  state 
member  bank.  This  breakdown  seems  particu- 
larly  interesting  in  view  of  the  well-known  argu- 
ment  that  membership  in  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  is  a  relatively  costly  alternative  to  non- 
membership,  inasmuch  as  reserve  balances  held 
with  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  are  noninterest 
bearing.  Although  the  high-earning  banks,  and 
to  a  lesser  extent  the  residual  banks,  favor  state 
charters  and  nonmember  status  in  the  Federal 
Reserve  System,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  this 
pattern  is  changing  somewhat.  It  will  be  recalled 
that  36  of  the  81  minority  banks  in  existence  at 
year-end  1975  were  not  included  in  the  final  selec- 
tion  process,  inasmuch  as  they  were  not  in  oper- 
ation  for  four  years  or  more.  Of  these  36  newer 
banks,  23  have  national  charters,  12  are  state 
nonmembers,  and  1 is  a  state  member.4  The  shift 
in  interest  to  national  bank  charters  is  probably 
related  to  the  liberalized  application  procedure 
toward  minority  banks  adopted  by  the  Comp- 
troller  of  the  Currency  in  the  early  1970’s. 
With  respect  to  age,  the  high-earning  and  re- 
sidual  banks  are  quite  similar.  The  mean  ages 
for  the  two  groups  are,  respectively,  21  and  16 
years.  Both  groups  can  be  considered  mature 
from  the  standpoint  of  experience  and  market 
representation.  As  Table  I  shows,  the  variation 
in  age  among  the  high-earning  banks  is  consider- 
able  ; 2  of  the  banks  date  from  1970,  while  3  were 
established  prior  to  World  War  II. 
Financial  Characteristics  Both  the  high-earning 
group  and  the  residual  group  have  an  eclectic 
makeup,  but  their  overall  nonfinancial  character- 
istics  are  not  that  dissimilar.  Inasmuch  as  this 
‘One  of  these  36  banks.  a  Mexican-American  nationally  chartered 
institution.  failed  in  19’76. 
is  the  case,  it  would  seem  that  there  is  a  good 
possibility  that  earnings  differentials  are  essenti- 
ally  the  result  of  management  differences.  Such. 
differences  would  appear  on  bank  balance  sheets 
and  income  statements,  and  it  is  the  purpose  of 
this  section  to  examine  and  compare  important 
financial  ratios  for  the  two  groups.  As  will  be- 
come  clear  below,  balance  sheet  management 
does  indeed  explain  the  success  of  the  high- 
earning  group. 
Capital  Position  Table  II  provides  a  summary  of 
the  capital  positions  of  the  high-earning  and  re- 
sidual  minority  bank  groups.  The  high-earning 
group,  as  the  table  illustrates,  is  somewhat  less 
heavily  capitalized  than  the  residual  group  for 
each  of  the  two  measures  shown.  Interestingly, 
the  same  measures  computed  for  all  commercia.1 
banks  in  the  U.  S.  on  a  four-year  consolidated 
basis  fall  above  the  summary  ratios  for  equit:y 
capital  and  reserves  and  between  the  summar,y 
ratios  for  total  capital  accounts.  For  all  commer- 
cial  banks,  equity  capital  and  reserves  as  a  per- 
cent  of  risk  assets  is  8.4,  while  total  capital  ac- 
counts  as  a  percent  of  risk  assets  is  9.0. 
The  comparison  group  of  11  high-earning  mi- 
nority  banks  has  been  selected  on  the  basis  of 
return  on  investment,  and  the  possibility  exists 
that  some  of  these  banks  could  have  achieved  a 
high  return  by  sacrificing  capital  adequacy.  For 
the  group,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  At 
7.5,  the  ratio  of  equity  capital  and  reserves  to 
risk  assets  is  below  that  of  all  commercial  banks 
and  the  residual  minority  bank  group,  but  is  nlot 
extremely  different.  As  the  capital  adequacy 
ranges  show,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  variabili,ty 
between  banks  within  groups;  this  is  especially 
Table  II 
CAPITAL  POSITION 
Four-Year  Consolidation 
Eleven  Thirty-three 
Measure  High-Earning  Residual 
Equity  capital  and  reserves/ 
Risk  assets1 
Group  7.5  a.2 
Range  within  group  4.3to11.7  2.6  to  29.6 
Total  capital  account/Risk  assets1 
Group  8.0  9.7 
Range  within  group  5.0  to  11.7  2.0  to  29.6 
’  Risk  assets  =  total  assets  -  cash  and  due  from  banks  -  W.  S. 
Treasury  securities. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1976 true  within  the  residual  group.  Only  one  bank  in 
the  high-earning  group,  whose  capital  ratios  show 
up  as  the  bottom  end  of  the  ranges  in  Table  II, 
is  seriously  undercapitalized.  Conversely,  none 
of  the  high-earning  banks  is  seriously  overcapi- 
talized.  There  are  several  overcapitalized  banks 
within  the  residual  group,  however. 
Sources  of  Funds  At  first  glance,  there  appears 
to  be  a  great  deal  of  similarity  regarding  the 
types  of  deposits  that  provide  the  minority  banks 
in  the  two  groups  with  their  major  source  of 
funds.  As  Table  III  indicates,  total  demand 
deposits  as  a  percent  of  total  liabilities  for  the 
high-earning  and  residual  groups  equals,  respec- 
tively,  41.3  and  43.3.  The  respective  percentages 
for  total  time  and  savings  deposits  to  total  lia- 
bilities  are  55.7  and  51.7.  These  ratios  suggest 
that  the  residual  group  is  in  a  relatively  more 
advantageous  position  than  the  high-earning 
group,  inasmuch  as  low-cost  demand  deposits  com- 
prise  a  larger  proportion  of  the  balance  sheet  and 
high-cost  time  and  savings  deposits  comprise  a 
smaller  proportion.  -4  closer  inspection,  howevert 
suggests  that  this  apparent  relative  advantage  in 
favor  of  the  residual  bank  group  is  more  than 
outweighed  by  other  adverse  factors. 
While  the  residual  group  does  enjoy  a  slightly 
greater  proportion  of  demand  deposits  to  total 
liabilities  than  the  high-earning  group,  a  fairly 
large  share  of  these  demand  deposits  is  in  the 
form  of  liabilities  to  governmental  bodies.  Only 
63.4  percent  of  the  demand  deposits  of  the  resid- 
ual  group  is  due  to  private  accounts,  as  compared 
to  77.0  percent  for  the  high-earning  group.  This 
has  several  implications.  First,  government  de- 
posits  are  encumbered  in  the  sense  that  they  limit 
a  bank’s  ability  to  allocate  funds  to  the  various 
available  uses;  these  deposits  must  be  secured  by 
holdings  of  U.  S.  Treasury,  or  municipal,  securi- 
ties.  Second,  large  holdings  of  governmental  de- 
posits  relative  to  private  deposits  may  reflect  a 
special  dependence  on  such  a  source  of  funds.  To 
the  extent  that  it  does,  it  means  that  a  bank  may 
be  overly  protected  and  less  inclined  to  compete 
for  private  business.  This,  clearly,  is  an  unde- 
sirable  long-run  situation.  The  residual  group 
is  a  heavier  holder  of  U.  S.  Government  (20.4 
versus  15.0  percent)  demand  deposits,  and  of 
state  and  local  (8.3  versus  3.6)  demand  cleposits, 
as  a  proportion  of  total  demand  deposits. 
The  advantage  to  the  residual  group  evidenced 
by  its  lower  dependence  on  time  and  savings  de- 
posits  is,  again,  more  apparent  than  real.  As  in 
Table  Ill 
SOURCES  OF  FUNDS 
Selected  Categories,  Four-Year  Consolidation 
Eleven 
Measure  High-Earning 
Total  demand  deposits/ 
Total  liabilities  41.3 
IPC  demand  deposits/ 
Total  demand  deposits  77.0 
U.  S.  Government  demand  deposits/ 
Total  demand  deposits  15.0 
Demand  deposits  of  states  and  local 







Totol  time  and  savings  deposits/ 
Total  liobiiities  55.7  51.7 
IPC  time  deposits/ 
Total  time  ond  savings  deposits  30.7  34.9 
Savings  deposits/ 
Total  time  and  savings  deposits  56.8  43.0 
U.  S.  Government  time  deposits/ 
Total  time  and  savings  deposits  2.1  4.0 
Time  deposits  of  states  and  local 
gov./Total  time  and  savings 
deposits  9.8  18.8 
large  denomination  time  deposits 
(over  $lOO,OOO)/Totol  time  and 
savings  deposits  10.2  16.0 
Federal  funds  purchases/ 
Total  liabilities  0.6  0.9 
the  case  of  demand  deposits,  the  residual  bank 
group  holds  a greater  proportion  of  U.  S.  Govern- 
ment,  and  state  and  local,  time  deposits  to  total 
time  and  savings  deposits  than  does  the  high- 
earning  group.  Xore  importantly,  however,  sav- 
ings  deposits  account  for  a  much  lower  propor- 
tion  of  total  time  and  savings  deposits  for  the 
residual  group  (43.0  percent)  than  for  the  high- 
earning  group  (56.S  percent).  Savings  accounts, 
of  course,  are  traditionally  viewed  as  being  the- 
most  stable  and,  in  the  long  run,  relatively  low 
cost,  form  of  deposits.  Their  strength  on  a  bank 
balance  sheet  also  suggests  a  high  degree  of 
market  penetration  for  consumer  business.  It 
could  be  argued  that  the  benefits  accruing  from 
large  savings  deposit  balances  are  offset  to  some 
degree  by  the  higher  activity  levels,  and  thus 
higher  costs,  associated  with  these  balances. 
These  costs  are  largely  recoverable,  however,  by 
the  imposition  of  service  charges  tied  to  account 
activity  levels. 
The  residual  group  does  display  a  clear  advan- 
tage  over  the  high-earning  group  with  respect  to 
solicitation  of  private  time  deposits.  Private  time 
deposits  as  a  percent  of  total  time  and  savings 
deposits  equals  34.9  for  the  residual  group  versus 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  7 30.7  for  the  high-earning  group.  This  may  reflect 
a  greater  aggressiveness  on  the  part  of  banks 
within  the  residual  group  to  bid  for  large  denomi- 
nation  deposits.  The  ratio  of  such  deposits  (those 
greater  than  $100,000)  to  total  time  and  savings 
deposits  is  16.0  for  the  residual  group  and  only 
10.2  for  the  high-earning  group. 
Both  comparison  groups  exhibit  a  very  low 
dependence  on  purchases  of  Federal  funds  as  a 
source  of  funds,  as  evidenced  by  their  ratios  of 
Federal  funds  purchased  to  total  liabilities.  Reli- 
ance  on  borrowed  funds  is  also  extremely  low  for 
both  groups  and  is,  therefore,  not  even  shown  in 
Table  III. 
Uses  of  Funds  Table  IV  summarizes  uses  of 
funds  for  the  two  groups  of  minority  banks.  It 
is  immediately  evident  that  there  exist  a  number 
of  major  differences  between  groups.  To  start 
with,  it  seems  as  if  the  residual  group  places  a 
higher  premium  on  portfolio  liquidity  than  does 
the  high-earning  group.  Cash  balances  and  de- 
posits  at  other  commercial  banks  as  a  percent  of 
total  assets  equals  11.9  and  10.1  for  the  residual 
and  high-earning  groups,  respectively.  Also,  the 
residual  group  allocates  a  much  greater  share  of 
funds  to  holdings  of  U.  S.  Treasury  securities  and 
a  somewhat  greater  share  to  holdings  of  securi- 
ties  issued  by  U.  S.  Government  agencies. 
Table  IV 
USES OF  FUNDS 
Selected  Categories,  Four-Year  Consolidation 
Eleven 
Meclsure  High-Earning 
Cash  and  due  from  banks/ 
Total  assets  10.1 
U.  S.  Treasury  securities/ 
Total  assets  9.9 
Obligations  of  U.  S.  Government 
agencies/Total  assets  12.0 
Obligations  of  states  and  local 
government/Total  assets  11.2 
Federal  funds  sold/Total  assets  5.6 
Other  loans/Total  assets  45.4 
Real  estate  loans/Other  loans  48.8 
Single-family  real  estate  loans/ 
Real  estate  loans  61.1 
loans  to  financial  institutions/ 
Other  loans  0.5 
Commerdol  and  industrial  loans/ 
Other  loans  26.3 
Loans  to  individuals/Other  loans  22.7 
Credit  card  loans/ 
loans  to  individuals  1.9 
















A  very  significant  difference  in  the  asset  port- 
folios  of  the  two  groups  arises  in  the  case  of 
municipal  investments.  At  11.2  percent,  the  ratio 
of  state  and  local  government  securities  to  total 
assets  for  the  high-earning  group  is  almost  double 
the  5.8  percent  of  the  residual  group.  This  sug 
gests  that  the  high-earning  group  is  much  more 
sensitive  to  the  need  for  sheltering  income  and 
that,  as  is  the  case  for  commercial  banks  gener- 
ally,  tax-free  municipal  securities  provide  an  im- 
portant  avenue  for  this. 
Sales  of  Federal  funds,  as  a  percent  of  total 
assets,  equal  5.6  for  the  high-earning  group  and 
7.0  for  the  residual  group.  This  probably  is  :a 
further  indication  of  the  higher  priority  given 
liquidity  and  security  by  the  residual  group.  It 
may  also,  however,  reflect  the  attractiveness  of 
higher  Federal  funds  yields  in  recent  years.  A 
highly  liquid  bank  is  able  to  shift  into  Federal 
funds  sales  much  more  readily  than  the  less  liquid 
bank.  Rates  on  Federal  funds  are  very  volatile, 
however,  and  ease  of  investment  in  Federal  funds 
is  hardly  a  good  reason  for  maintaining  an  ex- 
tremely  liquid  balance  sheet.  High  earnings  in 
one  investment  period  can  easily  be  offset  in 
subsequent  periods  of  generally  increased  bank- 
ing  system  liquidity  and  lower  interest  rates. 
The  high-earning  and  residual  groups  devote 
about  an  equal  amount  of  resources  to  loans;  the 
ratio  of  other  loans  to  total  assets  for  the  two 
groups  is  45.4  and  42.4,  respectively.  These  ratios 
lie  in  what  may  be  considered  a  very  conservative 
range,  so  far  as  bank  performance  generally  is 
concerned,  and  provide  evidence  that  both  groups 
are  essentially  conservative  users  of  available 
funds.  Although  the  high-earning  and  residual 
groups  seem  to  take  roughly  the  same  approach 
to  managing  total  loans  as  a  proportion  of  total 
assets,  they  are  not  at  all  similar  regarding  the 
types  of  loans  made.  While  the  high-earning 
group  is  much  more  heavily  committed  to  real 
estate  lending,  the  residual  group  is  much  more 
oriented  to  business  and  consumer  lending. 
Real  estate  loans  (or  all  loans  secured  primarily 
by  real  estate),  account  for  48.8  percent  of  total 
other  loans  (i.e.,  all  loans  excluding  Federal  funds 
sold  and  securities  purchased  under  agreements 
to  resell)  made  by  the  high-earning  group,  but 
only  29.9  percent  for  the  residual  group.  To  the 
extent  that  they  make  real  estate  loans,  both 
groups  are  heavily  oriented  to  single-family  mort- 
gage  loans,  probably  the  most  secure  type  of  real 
estate  loan  that  can  be  made.  The  high-earning 
group  is  generally  in  a  better  position  to  make 
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EXPENSES 
Selected  Categories,  Four-Year  Consolidation 
Measure 
As  a  percent  of  totol 
Eleven  Thirty-three 
High-Earning  Residual 
operating  expense: 
Employee  salaries,  wages, 
and  benefits  27.3  27.2 
Interest  paid  on  deposits  41.3  34.8 
Net  occupancy  expense  4.7  5.4 
Furniture  and  equipment  2.7  2.9 
Provisions  for  loan  losses  5.3  9.2 
Other  operating  expense  17.2  18.9 
Total  operating  expense/Totaf  assets  6.2  6.9 
real  estate  loans,  being  able  to  match  this  Iong- 
term  use  of  funds  with  a  large  base  of  stable 
savings  deposits. 
The  residual  bank  group  makes  up  for  its  much 
iower  relative  involvement  in  real  estate  lending 
by  activity  in  other  areas.  The  residual  group, 
for  example,  makes  2.8  percent  of  total  other 
loans  to  other  financial  institutions,  versus  0.5 
percent  for  the  high-earning  group.  More  im- 
portant,  however,  is  the  heavy  degree  of  involve- 
ment  by  the  residual  group  in  business  lending, 
with  38.2  percent  of  total  other  loans  falling  in 
the  commercial  and  industrial  category,  versus 
only  26.3  percent  for  the  high-earning  group,  This 
is  an  especially  important  finding  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  minority  banking  has  been  thought  of  as 
a  special  source  of  capital  to  the  minority  busi- 
ness  community  1121.  Clearly,  the  high-earning 
group  has  decided  that  the  risks  inherent  in  mi- 
nority  business  lending,  which  have  been  shown 
to  be  significant  [ 151,  are  so  great  as  to  be 
avoided  to  a  fairly  extreme  degree.  The  cautious 
approach  taken  by  the  high-earning  group  toward 
lending  to  minority  businesses  has  recently  been 
articulated  by  the  president  of  one  of  the  eleven 
banks  within  the  group.z  In  this  instance,  it  is 
pointed  out  that  minority  banks  take  a  more 
cautious  approach  toward  lending  in  the  minority 
business  community  than  many  majority  banks. 
In  the  area  of  consumer  lending?  the  residual 
group  is  again  significantly  more  active  than  the 
high-earning  group.  The  ratios  of  loans  to  indi- 
viduals  to  total  other  loans  for  the  two  minority 
bank  groups  are  27.5  and  22.7,  respectively. 
iigain,  the  high-earning  group  seems  to  have 
GJoseph D. Hutnmn,  “blinocit4’  Banker Warns  Sane  Btrnks  Over- 
eager  on  Minority  Lendins,”  Am&can  Bmke?,  Mw  13,  1956. 
adopted  management  policies  designed  to  mini- 
mize  its  involvement  in  a  more  risky  area  of 
lending.  While  both  groups  have  a  low  level  of 
participation  in  revolving  credit  to  consumers, 
the  high-earning  group  is  almost  twice  as  active 
in  this  speciaiized  area. 
Before  leaving  the  asset  side  of  the  balance 
sheet,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  extent  to  which 
bank  funds  are  tied  up  in  investment  in  bank 
premises.  -4t  2.1  percent,  the  ratio  of  bank  prem- 
ises  to  total  assets  for  the  high-earning  group  is 
about  one-third  less  than  the  3.1  percent  of  the 
residual  group.  This  means,  in  effect,  that  the 
high-earning  group  operates  with  considerably 
less  overhead  than  does  the  residual  group,  and 
the  funds  freed  up  from  investment  in  fixed  assets 
can  be  applied  to  earning  uses.  Both  groups,  it 
might  be  mentioned,  have  a  greater  investment  in 
fixed  assets  than  is  typically  the  case  in  the  bank- 
ing  industry.  All  insured  commercial  banks,  on  a 
four-year  consolidated  basis,  have  a  bank  prem- 
ises  to  total  assets  ratio  of  1.6  percent,  and  all 
banks  with  less  than  $50  million  in  assets  have  a 
ratio  of  1.7. 
Expenses  o-szd  Income  Tables  V  and  VI  sum- 
marize,  respectively,  the  expense  and  income 
characteristics  of  the  high-earning  and  residual 
groups.  In  brie:,  the  high-earning  group  is  shown 
to  be  more  efricient  with  regard  to  both  control  of 
Table  VI 
INCOME 
Selected  Categories,  Four-Year  Consolidation 
Eleven 
Measure  High-Earning 
As  a  percent  of  total 
operating  income: 
Interest  and  fees  on  loans  53.3 
Income  on  Federal  funds  sold  7.5 
Trust  department  income  1.5 
Service  charge  income  7.8 
Other  operating  income  1.2 
interest  and  dividends  en 
investments  30.0 
As  a  percent  of  interest  and  dividends 
on  investments 
Income  on  Lt.  5.  Treasury  securities  31.9 
Income  on  obligations  of  U,  S. 
Government  agencies  35.8 
Income  on  obiigations  of  states  and 
loco1 governments  23.0 
Total  operating  income/Total  assets  7.0 
Operating  income  -  operating  expense/ 
Total  assets  0.8 
Net  income/Equity  capital 
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clusion  is  based  on  the  total  operating  expense  to 
total  asset  and  total  operating  income  to  total 
asset  ratios  shown  in  the  tables.  The  high-earning 
group  incurs  expenses  equal  to  6.2  percent  of  total 
assets  and  generates  income  equal  to  7.0  percent 
of total  assets;  its  spread  of  gross  income  over  ex- 
penses  amounts  to  0.8  percent  of  total  assets.  The 
residual  group  incurs  expenses  equal  to  6.9  per- 
cent  of  total  assets  and  generates  income  equal 
to  6.8  percent  of  total  assets.  In  the  case  of  the 
residual  bank  group,  therefore,  expenses  exceed  gross 
income,  and  an  operating  loss  equal  to  0.1  percent 
of  total  assets  results.  For  comparative  purposes 
it  is  interesting  to  note  that  for  all  insured  com- 
mercial  banks  the  spread  of  gross  income  over 
expenses,  on  a  four-year  consolidated  basis, 
amounts  to  1.0  percent  of  total  assets.  While 
generating  less  income  in  relation  to  total  assets 
than  the  high-earning  group,  at  6.6  percent,  ex- 
penses  to  total  assets  for  all  insured  commercial 
banks  is  also  much  lower,  at  5.6  percent. 
These  basic  indexes  of  management  perform- 
ance  ultimately,  of  course,  affect  the  profitability 
of  the  two  groups,  as  shown  in  Table  VI.  Con- 
solidated  return  on  investment  for  the  high- 
earning  group  is  a  very  respectable  12.6  percent, 
while  that  for  the  residual  group  is  -2.3  percent. 
An  analysis  of  group  expenses  provides  a  way 
of  determining  the  nature  of  the  differences  be- 
tween  the  high-earning  and  residual  groups  on 
this  important  factor  leading  to  CROI.  Both 
groups  devote  an  almost  equal  proportion  of  total 
operating  expense  (keeping  in  mind  that  their 
operating  expense  as  a  proportion  of  total  assets 
differs)  to  employee  remuneration  ;  the  percent- 
ages  are  27.3  for  the  high-earning  group  and  27.2 
for  the  residual  group.  This  is  the  second  most 
important  expense  item  in  the  commercial  bank- 
ing  industry,  and  the  equality  between  groups 
suggests  that  the  labor  market  conditions  they 
face  are  about  equal.  Interest  expense  on  de- 
posits  is  the  bi ggest  banking  industry  expense 
and,  as  the  source  of  funds  analysis  undertaken 
above  would  suggest,  the  high-earning  group 
allocates  a  much  greater  proportion  of  total  ex- 
pense  to  this  category.  This  is  due  to  the  high- 
earning  group’s  heavier  reliance  on  time  and 
savings  deposits  as  a  source  of  funds. 
Previous  analysis  also  suggests  that  overhead 
expenses  for  the  high-earning  group  should  be 
less  than  those  for  the  residual  group,  and  this 
turns  out  to  be  the  case.  Net  occupancy  expense 
for  the  high-earning  group  is  only  4.7  percent  of 
total  expenses,  as  compared  to  5.4  percent  for  the 
residual  group.  Equipment  expense  for  the  high- 
earning  group  is  also  a  somewhat  lower  propor- 
tion  of  total  expenses  than  for  the  residual  group, 
at  2.7  and  2.9  percent,  respectively. 
Loan  loss  provisions,  which  are  treated  as  a 
current  operating  expense,  are  significantly  dif- 
ferent  for  the  two  groups.  Such  provisions 
amount  to  only  5.3  percent  of  total.expenses  for 
the  high-earning  group,  but  increase  to  9.2  per- 
cent  for  the  residual  group.  This  one  expense 
category  is  so  high  for  the  residual  group  as  to 
almost  eliminate  the  advantage  it  has  due  to  low 
deposit  costs.  The  high  loan  loss  expense  is, 
most  likely,  associated  with  the  higher  propor- 
tions  of  business  and  consumer  loans  made  by 
the  residual  group.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
the  four-year  consolidated  loan  loss  expense  for 
all  insured  commercial  banks  is  4.2  percent,  con- 
siderably  below  that  of  even  the  high-earning 
group. 
Interest  and  fees  on  loans  as  a  percent  of  total 
operating  income  for  the  two  groups  is  roughly 
the  same,  at  53.3  percent  for  the  high-earning 
group  and  52.2  percent  for  the  residual  group. 
This,  however,  is  not  what  one  would  expect 
given  the  composition  of  their  loan  portfolios. 
The  high-earning  group  is  relatively  heavily  in- 
vested  in  illiquid,  but  relatively  low  risk,  real 
estate  loans.  Conversely,  the  residual  group  is 
relatively  heavily  invested  in  more  risky  business 
and  consumer  loans.  If,  as  would  be  expected, 
the  residual  bank  group  were  compensated  for 
the  increase  in  risk  associated  with  its  business 
and  consumer  lending,  then  such  a  premium 
would  be  reflected  in  higher  interest  income  on 
loans.  This  is  clearly  not  the  case.  Both  groups 
have  about  the  same  proportion  of  income  derived 
from  loan  interest  and,  while  their  total  loan  port- 
folios  equal  about  the  same  percentage  of  assets, 
the  risk  distribution  is  quite  different.  The  resid- 
ual  group  should  be  charging  higher  interest 
rates  on  loans  in  order  to  compensate  for  the 
additional  risk,  which  is  reflected  in  its  high.er 
expense  for  loan  losses.  In  practice,  however, 
the  rate  of  return  on  loan  portfolio  (computed 
from  interest  and  fees  on  loans/total  other  1oan.s) 
is  almost  identical  for  the  two  groups.  The  rates 
of  return  on  loan  portfolio  for  the  high-earning 
and  residual  groups  are,  respectively,  8.26  percent 
and  S.33  percent. 
In  a  number  of  other  respects,  the  income 
sources  for  the  two  groups  are  similar.  Both 
derive  a  fairly  large  share  of  income  from  Federal 
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banks  generally.  Likewise,  their  service  charge 
income  is  fairly  high:  although  it  is  more  so  for 
the  residual  group.  Trust  department  income 
makes  a  very  minor  contribution  to  total  income. 
Interest  and  dividends  earned  on  investments 
represents  30.0  percent  of  total  operating  income 
ior  the  high-earning  group  and  28.4  percent  for 
the  residual  group.  These  proportions  are  close 
but,  as  in  the  case  of  loans,  disguise  important 
differences  of  portfolio  composition.  The  residual 
group  is  relatively  heavily  invested  in  U.  S. 
Treasury  securities  and  relatively  under  invested 
in  municipal  securities,  while  the  converse  is  true 
for  the  high-earning  group.  Thus,  the  residual 
group  derives  80.2  percent  of  its  investment  in- 
come  from  the  taxable  yields  off  U.  S.  Treasury 
and  U.  S.  Government  agency  securities,  and  only 
12.8  percent  off  nontaxable  municipal  securities. 
The  high-earning  group  derives  67.7  percent  of 
its  investment  income  from  U.  S.  Treasury  and 
Zr.  S.  Government  agency  securities,  and  23.0 
percent  from  municipal  securities. 
The  importance  of  tax  management  differences 
between  the  two  groups  cannot  be  overempha- 
sized.  The  high-earning  group  has  managed  its 
tax  position  in  such  a  way  as  to  minimize  appli- 
cable  corporate  income  taxes;  indeed,  its  appli- 
cable  income  taxes  as  a  percent  of  gross  income 
equals  only  20.5  percent.  For  the  residual  group.. 
an  unusual  result  is  obtained.  It  will  be  recalled 
that  this  group  has  sustained  an  income  loss  over 
the  four-year  consolidation  ;  nonetheless,  the 
group  has  still  paid  corporate  income  taxes  equal 
to  30.4  percent  of  its  losses.  This  contradictory 
situation  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  mem- 
bers  of  the  group  have  had  different  tax  and 
earning  experiences,  some  earning  no  income  and 
paying  no  tas  and  some  paying  tax  on  earned 
income.  Also,  the  tax  and  earnings  data  are  con- 
solidated  over  a  four-year  period,  allowing  yearly 
income  period  fluctuations  to  show  up  in  the 
final  figures. 
The  high-earning  group,  incidentally,  has  been 
able  to  achieve  its  status  without  paying  out  an 
excessive  proportion  of  net  income  in  dividends. 
Cash  dividends  paid  by  the  high-earning  group 
amounts  to  a  conservative  28.4  percent  of  net 
income.  This  means  that  a  significant  portion  of 
earnings  has  been  retained  and  added  to  reserve 
accounts.  The  residual  group  has  paid  cash  divi- 
dends  equal  to  35.1  percent  of  its  losses;  thi$ 
anomalous  situation  is  explained  by  the  consoli- 
dation  process  described  above  in  the  context  of 
tax  payments. 
Summary  and  Conclusions  In  this  study,  mi- 
nority-owned  commercial  banks  with  four  years 
or  more  operating  experience  are  divided  into  two 
comparison  groups  according  to  earnings  per- 
formance.  Those  banks  with  a  four-year  consoli- 
dated  return  on  investment  of  10  percent  or 
better  constitute  the  high-earning  group,  while 
the  ren:air:ing  banks  with  a  four-year  consoli- 
dated  return  on  investment  of  less  than  10  per- 
cent  are  combined  into  a  residual  group.  The 
performance  of  the  high-earning  group  is  COIII- 
pared  with  that  of  the  residual  group  through  an 
anal>-.;rc;  oi  key  operating  ratios. 
Tht:  findings  indicate  that  the  high-earning 
group  is  somewhat  more  adept  at  generating  in- 
come  t*::ar.: is  the  residual  group;  total  operating 
income  to  total  assets  is  7.0  for  the  high-earning 
group  and  6.8  for  the  residual  group.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  high-earning  group  is  much  more 
effective  at  controlling  expenses  than  the  residual 
group,  the  respective  ratios  of  total  operating 
expense  to  total  assets  being  6.2  and  6.9.  Conse- 
querlrix.  she  high-earning  group  has  an  excess  of 
operaring  income  over  operating  expense  equal  to 
0.8  l>crceilt  of  total  assets,  compared  to  an  excess 
of  operating  expense  over  operating  income  of 
0.1  percent  for  the  residual  group.  Both  groups 
invest  a  fairly  low  propoition  of  funds,  about  43 
percent,  in  loans.  The  types  of  loans  made,  how- 
ever,  are  quite  different  between  groups;  real 
estate  loans  dominate  the  portfolio  of  the  high- 
earning  group,  and  commercial  and  industrial 
loans  dominate  the  portfolio  of  the  residual 
group.  With  respect  to  securities,  the  high: 
earning  group  favors  tax-free  municipals  while 
the  residual  group  favors  U.  S.  Treasury  securi- 
ties.  Employee  remuneration  accounts  for  27 
percent  of  toral  expenses  for  both  groups.  Inter- 
est  paid  on  deposits  is  a  much  higher  expense  for 
the  high-earning  group,  which  relies  to  a  greater 
extent  on  time  and  savings  deposits  than  does  the 
residual  proup.  This  higher  expense  item  for  the 
high-ea:-:;ing  group  is  offset  by  lower  occupancy 
and  loa::  ions  charges  and  by  lower  general  oper- 
ating  esperises.  The  management  practices  fol- 
lowed  aiiow  the  high-earning  group  to  achieve  a 
four-year  consolidated  return  on  investment  of 
12.6  percent,  compared  with  a  loss  of  2.3  percent 
for  iIkt:  J-csidual  group. 
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basic  conclusions  about  minority  banks.  First, 
there  exist  a  variety  of  circumstances  under 
which  minority  banks  can  successfully  operate; 
this  is  suggested  by  the  heterogeneous  nature  of 
the  high-earning  group.  Although  such  factors 
as  size,  location,  type  of  charter,  etc.  may,  and 
probably  do  influence  bank  operation,  they  do  not 
dictate  success  or  failure.  Rather,  quality  of  fi- 
nancial  management  appears  to  be  the  critical 
determinant  of  minority  bank  performance. 
Second,  there  appears  to  be  a  direct  conflict  be- 
tween  market  exigencies  faced  by  minority  banks 
generally,  for  example  the  need  to  correctly  as- 
sess  and  balance  risk  and  return  on  loans,  and  the 
idealized  set  of  community  service  goals  under 
which  minority  banks  are  often  conceived.  This 
conflict  is  most  evident  in  the  differences  between 
the  loan  policies  of  the  high-earning  and  residual 
groups.  The  high-earning  group  has  clearly 
chosen  to  forego  some  lending  opportunities,  par- 
ticularly  in  the  business  and  consumer  loan  areas, 
due  to  what  is  evidently  viewed  as  excessive  risk. 
The  residual  group  has  been  much  more  active  in 
making  business  and  consumer  loans  in  the  mi- 
nority  community  but  has  suffered  from  unusu- 
ally  large  losses.  It  is  largely  the  relative  success 
in  limiting  the  expense  of  losses  associated  with 
bad  loans  that  provides  the  high-earning  group 
with  its  margin  of  performance  over  the  residual 
group.  While  many  minority  banks  choose  to 
follow  the  typical  path  of  success  laid  out  by 
nonminority  banks,  particularly  in  making  high 
proportions  of  business  loans,  the  loan  portfolio 
of  the  high-earning  group  definitely  reflects  a 
concern  with  the  special  risk  that  might  be  con- 
nected  with  this  type  of  lending  in  the  minority 
community.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  suc- 
cessful  banking  in  the  minority  community  re- 
quires  very  careful  attention  to  asset  quality  and 
may  not  be  wholly  compatable  with  the  capital 
demands  of  minority  business. 
The  high-earning  group  is,  in  a  number  of  im- 
portant  ways,  more  like  majority-owned  and 
operated  commercial  banks  than  like  the  residual 
group.  For  example,  the  high-earning  group  is 
more  competitive  and  market  oriented  than  the 
residual  group,  as  evidenced  by  its  deposit  struc- 
ture.  It  is  more  conscious  of  operating  efficiency, 
as  shown  through  key  expense  ratios.  And,  not 
least  important,  the  high-earning  group  seems 
more  adept  at  practicing  the  subtleties  of  finan- 
cial  management  than  the  residual  group:  evi- 
dence  of  this  is  provided  by  the  tax  management 
practices  of  the  two  groups.  More  interesting, 
though,  is  the  fact  that  the  high-earning  group 
does  more  than  simply  copy  the  portfolio  be- 
havior  of  successful  nonminority  banks.  Rather, 
it  applies  the  practice  of  accepted  management 
patterns  to  fit  the  special  environment  in  which  it 
operates,  thus  achieving  financial  success. 
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